A seemingly excited boy begins Plato's Meno. Meno seems to have learned what virtue is and is eager to share this knowledge with the famous Socrates. Therefore, Meno tactically asks calculated questions of Socrates: “…is virtue something that can be taught? Or does it come from practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice that gives it to man, but natural aptitude or something else?"[1] One immediately notices Meno's enthusiasm in discussing virtue. Furthermore, behind Meno's sincere and keen interest lies a somewhat arrogant desire to demonstrate his knowledge to Socrates. But does Meno really know what he thinks he knows? Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay On the other hand, we see a skeptical Socrates. He is very wary of accepting certain opinions, no matter how sensible they may seem. Socrates accuses Gorgias of having accustomed Meno to the habit of answering questions with confidence, as is appropriate for those who know: "sper eoV touV edta".[2] Socrates often uses various forms of the verb "from" in this part of the dialogue as he refers to knowing what virtue is. According to the Middle Liddell Lexicon, “edtaV” is the perfect participle of “da” – translated in the present tense – meaning “those who know”. Furthermore, “oda” is related to “oraw” which means “to see or watch”.[3] So, “oda” tends to have to do with what is known by being seen, and not just by thinking. The process of "seeing" or "knowing" implied in the use of "oida" could be literal or metaphorical. Figuratively speaking, the thing in question could be perceived in the mind's eye, reflected upon, and perhaps eventually known. For this reason “oida” could mean “to know by reflection or perception”. In light of this figurative definition, perhaps, Socrates is referring to those “people who know” – touV edta – as people who have a vision of the being of something, in contrast to those who simply claim to know – even if in reality they do they know. I do not know. Socrates sarcastically tells Meno that Meno speaks as if he knows, thus distinguishing Meno from those who actually know. These people who simply claim to know one thing do not actually see the whole thing. They only see the different parts of a thing and assume that by seeing the parts they have seen the whole. This seems to be the case with Meno's analysis of virtue. Meno lists various examples of virtue but does not identify what virtue is. Socrates, therefore, tells him: “…do not think that you can explain it[4] to anyone in terms of its parts, or with any similar kind of explanation. Rather, understand that the question itself remains unanswered; you say this and that about virtue, but what is it?”[5] Meno is expected to stop evading the question of interest and fully identify virtue. However, it seems that Meno is struggling and doing his best. It is important to note that Meno begins this investigation of virtues in a very promising way. He doesn't seem as dense as people think of him. The atmosphere at the beginning of the dialogue is optimistic. The investigation of virtue did not seem difficult. Meno casually makes his first attempt to explain what virtue is. In summary, according to Meno, a virtuous man must be capable of managing the affairs of the city and a virtuous woman must be a good housewife.[6] His second attempt is equally enthusiastic: “it must simply be the ability to govern men”.[7] After Socrates refutes Meno's definition for the second time, Meno seems to lose some of his confidence. He begins to realize that he may not have the knowledge he thinks he has. Although Meno is not often seen as a smart guy,embodies the virtue of perseverance. This positive attitude of Meno towards understanding the "being" of virtue is what keeps the dialogue going. It seems that Meno's difficulty in defining virtue is not due to stupidity but to the natural tendency to jump to multiplicity while talking about virtue. It could also be that virtue is in some way immaterial, so much so that it cannot be defined in the way a material thing can be. In the course of their dialogue, Socrates and Meno encounter several analogies, such as the analogy of the swarm of bees, the analogy of shapes, etc. Initially these analogies appear to be useful in the pursuit of virtue. However, despite the apparent usefulness of these analogies, Meno finds it difficult to map them appropriately onto virtue itself. That is, relating these analogies to virtue without generality. He knows how to approach virtue by discussing analogies, but once again he enters into plurality when he refers to virtue. What then makes a precise characterization of virtue more difficult than an analogical description? In other words, is virtue too broad to define? It seems that analogies do not guarantee understanding. However, analogies attempt to bring the reader closer to the meaning of something and, perhaps, make it easier to understand that thing. Plato seems to accentuate the limits of analogical thinking in philosophy. A thought-provoking alteration in the vocabulary is seen when Socrates introduces “gignwskw” alongside “oida.” Socrates asks Meno if someone who doesn't know Meno could describe him: “…st Ma µ se to parpa st estin, tt eda ete kaloV....”[8] Just like “da”, “gignwskw” also means "to know" . It is therefore difficult to define the connotative difference between these two words. The Liddell and Scott Lexicon defines "gignwskw" with different words including observe, understand, discern, distinguish, recognize, etc. Considering the subtle distinction that Socrates tries to make, however, it seems that "gignwskw" has to do with discernment in observation, while "oida" has to do with reflection on observation. Socrates tries to demonstrate that one must be able to observe — gignwskw — Meno's personality to know or see — from — his attributes. Therefore, if someone is unable to distinguish Meno from some other male, that person would not be able to characterize Meno either. Another interesting use of “gignwskw” – but this time together with “oiomai” – occurs in section 77 of the dialogue. Meno makes his third attempt to explain what virtue is. In the words of a poet, Meno defines virtue as "desiring beautiful things and being able to acquire them".[9] Socrates, however, rejects this definition by pointing out that everyone, even the most non-virtuous, desires good things. Socrates illustrates that people desire something that is bad only when they mistake evil for good. No one, seeing clearly that something is wrong, will proceed to want it. Before reaching this conclusion, Socrates asks: “μe ta kaka aa ea, legeiV, kai gignwskonteV t kaka estin µ pμs at;” This is translated into English as: “And would you say that others suppose evils to be good, or still desire them even if they recognize them as evil?”[10] Here a contrast is made between the frank supposition – oh yes – and the actual recognition : gignwskw. Socrates points out that assuming something is a certain way is not enough to make a person knowledgeable. Furthermore, "oiomai", according to the Liddell and Scott Lexicon is primarily translated as: "think, suppose and believe". Unlike “gignwskw,” mere thinking is distinct from actual understanding. Meno initially confuses "thought" with "knowing" in his pursuit of virtue. But this problem may not only apply to Meno. It's easy to tell when yes 3-4