Following the countless advances in the field of robotics and sexual aid technology, a topic that has recently garnered much attention and debate concerns humanoid sexual robots, henceforth later called "sexbots". The main intent of a sexbot is to bring pleasure and sexual gratification, in a similar way to that of their human counterparts. In contrast to inflatable silicone sex dolls, sexbots are equipped with artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and programmed to provide and respond to sexual behaviors and actions, making them a more responsive version of their immobile predecessors. One sexbot maker in particular, TrueCompanion, has come under intense scrutiny following the revelation of model Roxxxy's "Frigid Farah" setting, which is described as "very private and does not always like to engage in intimate activities" (" FAQ" ). Additionally, Roxxxy also has other pre-programmed personality types, such as "Wild Wendy", "S&M Susan", "Mature Martha", and "Young Yoko". In addition to concerns about allowing consumers the opportunity to simulate rape, critics have questioned the reductive nature of such personality types and how they appear to reinforce harmful stereotypes about women, especially in heterosexual encounters between human males and sexbots feminine. Say no to plagiarism. . Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay In essence, the main question of this topic is focused on the notion of consent, whether such a thing can exist in human-sexbot relationships, and, if so, whether there is a legal way in which norms can be applied in case of violation of consent. I am convinced that, although sexbots are ultimately commercial products made for human consumption, the ability for them to behave as non-consenting partners during a sexual encounter, while still having to fulfill their ultimate purpose of providing sexual gratification – “Frigid” Farah style ” – is problematic, dangerous and unethical in nature, particularly from the dominant feminist perspective. Assuming that the current trajectory of technological progress will eventually lead to the creation of sexbots that are virtually indistinguishable from humans, in terms of appearance and perceived consciousness, this essay will first detail the divergent opinions on specific aspects of what makes a sexbot and what makes it unlike humans, and how consent serves as a controversial factor in sexbot-human interactions, before delving into possible legal options to alleviate the potential issue of consent violation. Before discussing the concept of consent, it is pertinent to note the restrictions on implementing current laws on sexual encounters between sexbots and humans, particularly regarding rape and sexual violence. According to the United States Department of Justice, rape is defined as: “Penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sexual organ of a 'another person, without the consent of the victim” (“An updated definition”). Considering what constitutes a “person” and what defines “personhood,” attempts to impose that definition on a robotic partner may prove difficult. Certainly, a test was designed to meet this demand to some extent. The Turing Test, developed by computer scientist Alan Turing, is still used today to evaluate whether software can demonstrate intelligent human-like behavior. However, the test also faced a lot of criticism. Quotedin Zerega's article, tech executive Kai-Fu Lee argued for an update that values ​​physical realism as much as processing power, "there should be a cyborg with human skin, human vision, human speech, and speech human. The test should judge the humanity or naturalness of the cyborg with all the above abilities” (Zerega). This is in line with TrueCompanion's efforts with Roxxxy, whose physical appearance is entirely customizable and, behaviorally, "interacts just like a human" ("FAQ"). “Humanity,” as Lee puts it, is now the next level that AI software must aspire to reach. Regardless of how subjectively believable a sexbot's appearance or behavior may be, that does not automatically and objectively make him or her "human" in the eyes of the public. law. This then raises the question of how a sexbot will be considered and classified. Sexbots are a curiosity, as they exist in the zone between sex toy and human replica. TrueCompanion also makes this comparison, asking, "If woman can have a vibrator, why can't men have a Roxxxy?" ("Frequently Asked Questions"). However, this seems like an unbalanced approach. As Robert Sparrow points out in “Robots, Rape, and Representation,” “[Sex] is a relationship. Someone has sex with someone… However, since robots are not (yet) sentient, a robot is never “someone”… Strictly speaking, robot sex is actually robot masturbation” (Sparrow). Even thinking about the implications of human-sexbot relationships, we impose a presumed personality on the sexbot. We think of it as a participatory party separate from vibrators, fleshlights and masturbation sleeves. If one day sexbots were to become autonomous, sentient humanoid "robots] capable of defeating Turing" (Rogers), the distinctions between programmable machine and independent android will only become more complex, once again exacerbating the difficulties linked to the development of legal protections. Regarding the topic of personality, it is not determinable whether a sexbot has the ability to consent. The function and existence of a sexbot is based on its ability to provide sexual pleasure. It is the near personification of sexual activity, packaged as a commodity available for purchase. This is reminiscent of Dworkin's view of sex and the subjugation of women as a whole: “Being owned and being fucked are or have been virtually synonymous experiences in women's lives. …getting fucked and being possessed are inseparably the same thing; together, being the same, they are sex for women under male domination as a social system” (Dworkin). This is literally the foundation on which sexbots are built and the very thing that mainstream feminists fear most: robots are objects, made in the image of the ideal female erotic partner, to be obtained and used for sexual purposes, just as they are programmed. What makes the possibility of a consenting sexbot unlikely is its instilled function and power wielded by its owner and programmer. Kathleen Richardson of the Campaign Against Sex Robots perceives this as a parallel to prostitution, where “only the buyer of sex is given subjectivity, the seller of sex is reduced to a thing” (Richardson). Sexbots are essentially masturbation tools, regardless of their human sentience, which makes consent an implication that can't even enter into the equation. However, it is undeniable that a built-in resistance setting, such as "Frigid Farah", is a courageous approach. on the relationship between sexual activity and consent. Seeing a sexbot demonstrate reluctance, despite ultimately only being able toconsenting to sexual behavior, is a dangerous game to play. Based on Janet Halley's definitions in “The Move to Affirmative Consent,” this means that sexbots can only express constrained consent, disguised as subjective positive consent. Not only does it reject the principles of affirmative consent – ​​“yes” means “yes” – it also leaves room for performative non-consent – ​​“no” may seem like “no”, but it will eventually become “yes”. Of course, any sexual interaction with a sexbot is just a simulation, which does not and cannot bear the same severity with a human partner. But, Sparrow argues this, “If the rape of a robot represents and simulates the rape of a real woman, then the performance of the first act implicates the agent in a relationship with the second” (Sparrow). While sexual engagement with an reluctant bot is unlikely to cause a direct increase in sexual violence against women, it is undoubtedly instrumental in informing male instigators about how sexual encounters can be conducted. With prolonged use, it can even desensitize male users to the consequences of sexual assault. Rogers agrees with this view, even from the instigator's perspective: “It's hard to consent if you don't know who or what you're consenting to. The company? The other people on the network? The programmer? The algorithm?" (Rogers). From this, it is clear that consent may not even exist between any of the parties involved in human-sexbot relationships, further complicating the issue at hand. A key argument in defense of sexbots is how they can serve from venting sexual violence . response to the negative reaction to “Frigid Farah,” TrueCompanion says, “[she] can be used to help people understand how to be intimate with a partner… Our customers buy Roxxxy because they want to. experience the company" ("FAQ"). However, this once again calls into question the possible future drawbacks. An example of this would be the personality type "Young Yoko", which should simultaneously display the virginal qualities of naivety and inexperience and maintaining “a personality over the age of 18” (“FAQ”). This seems too strongly like a slight nod to pedophilia, and like “Young Yoko” it seems to echo pornographic video titles advertising “barely legal teenagers” and perhaps straddles the line of statutory rape, if it were applicable to sexbots. In an interview with The Atlantic, Shin Takagi, who founded Trottla, a company that makes sex dolls that look like children, and has never acted on his pedophilic impulses, says: "I'm helping people express their own desires, legally and ethically". (Morino). Peter Fagan of the John Hopkins School of Medicine, however, disagrees, believing that "contact with Trottla products would probably have a "reinforcing effect" on pedophilic ideation and "in many cases, would cause it to be implemented more urgency." ' (Morino). This serves to illustrate the conflict between the positive right to privacy and the negative right to protection, as determined by Frances Olsen and rooted in the existence of sexbots, where Takagi's freedom to manage his impulses based on the reality of men… privacy—conflicts with the right of all children to safety from sexual assault—protection An equally divisive line of logic is found in the similarities between the human-sexbot relationship and sadomasochism, or its lack.Since s/m is fixated on simulating sexual behavior that is potentially non-consensual and/or deemed inappropriate and unacceptable by society, it can be argued that the use of "Frigid Farah" is the same. This is where I find myself at odds with feminists' perception of sadomasochistic relationshipsdominant. As pointed out by Ummni Khan in Vicarious Kinks, dominant feminists see the practice of s/m as a replication and reference to abuse within patriarchal and heteronormative relationships, which ultimately oppresses women even when practiced by a lesbian couple (Khan). I disagree with this point of view, as well as the conclusion drawn regarding “Frigid Farah”, and instead stand with sex-positive pro-s/me feminists. BDSM is in fact a practice of simulating scenarios and an intentional exchange of power. Despite this, BDSM is also firmly rooted in two or more consenting parties participating in domination or submission, with the utmost respect towards the sanctity of the safeword, in order to maintain the fantasy aspect of role-play. All decision-making power rests in the hands of the submissive, who has the right to withdraw consent at any time, and the Dominant must subsequently comply. In encounters between men and sexbots, particularly those involving settings like “Frigid Farah,” the bot possesses no such power. Therefore, this comparison is also a false equivalence. The following three suggestions for legal regulations are nothing more than broad speculation. However, they are intended to serve as guiding points, to effectively consider what possible options exist and how they might impact the sexbot industry. The first two suggestions adhere to Heath, Braimoh and Gouweloos' piece on Judging Women's Sexual Agency: one takes the position of danger – a total ban on sexbots – while the other the position of choice – preventative measures to reduce the chances of harm or in general realism (Heath et al.). By enacting a blanket ban on sexbots, much like the criminalization of prostitution, this would reduce exposure to opportunities for simulated exploitation and directly end the perpetuation of the harmful gender imbalance condemned by mainstream feminists. This similarity to the criminalization of prostitution, however, comes with the potential outcome of unjust punishment and the resulting violation of autonomy. As Donald Dripps explains in “Beyond Rape,” everyone has the positive autonomy to commit an act and the negative autonomy not to commit that act (Dripps). In the case of the sexbot ban, Roxxxy owners' freedom to have sexual intercourse with "Frigid Farah" interferes with other Roxxxy owners' freedom not to use her in that specific environment, thus forcing everyone who owns and produces Roxxxy to suffer the same serious consequences. Undoubtedly, this will also lead to immense economic losses for everyone involved in the sexbot industry. The position chosen, on the contrary, is driven towards minimizing damage, more oriented towards protection than sanctions. In “The Squishy Ethics of Sex With Robots,” inspired by privacy researcher Sarah Lewis, Rogers suggests shifting the scale of realism in the opposite direction and making robots less human-like: “If the only relationship people want with the device is a physicist, or if the device is an interface with a human partner, why does it look just like a human?” (Rogers). In this way, sexbots will become more similar to other existing sex toys and therefore will no longer be financially burdened by the pressures of constant improvement. Likewise, if it is necessary to maintain human-like realism, aiming for a poorly tolerated residue can also be useful. Introduced by Duncan Kennedy in “Sexy Dressing,” the tolerated residue refers to the “sexual abuse of women by men…which is effectively permitted by the legal regime” (Kennedy). If sexbot manufacturers developed a response system that allowed their robots.