The main issue when addressing this topic, but in general when addressing issues of global justice, is to maintain an impartial position. Defining terrorism by excluding any moral judgment from the reasoning would result in a complete, impartial, but also complex argument. To do this a political philosopher should keep in mind the concepts of “value neutrality”, “valuelessness” and “value independence”. Professor Carter clearly emphasized the difference between the concepts in his “Value-freeness and Value-neutrality in the Analysis of Political Concepts”. “Value freedom” concerns the place (or rather, absence) of evaluative terms in the definition of a concept, while value neutrality implies a suspension of judgment on the comparative merits of divergent ethical positions. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Each of these two characteristics is a methodological desideratum in the case of certain concepts in certain theoretical contexts. Sometimes it is appropriate to take an empirical approach to analyzing and defining a concept, and this requires a value-free definition. Sometimes it is appropriate to adopt an ethically non-committal approach, and this requires a certain degree of value neutrality. The two approaches can be combined but, as we will see, they can also be separated. Furthermore, it is useful to make a distinction between valuelessness and value-neutrality, on the one hand, and the complete detachment of our analysis from all ethical concerns, on the other. This last idea can be called “value independence”. There may be ethical reasons for adopting an empirical approach to the analysis and definition of a given concept. And one may have ethical reasons to take a noncommittal approach to a given set of ethical positions. Therefore, neither freedom nor value neutrality should be motivated by a desire to separate one's analysis from all ethical concerns. Value independence might imply valuelessness and value-neutrality, but the reverse is certainly not true. Value neutrality is said to be useful because it provides us with a shared starting point in terms of which to express genuine ethical disagreements. Valuelessness means that a concept is valueless if its definition is such that the definiens contains no evaluative terms. “Value neutrality” on the other hand is when the use of a concept does not imply the superiority of any of a set of contrasting substantive ethical viewpoints. Unlike valuelessness, value neutrality is a matter of degree, since value neutrality always exists with respect to a particular range of substantive ethical viewpoints, and this range can vary in breadth. A concept is value-independent if its definition can be justified exclusively in terms of theoretical-explanatory considerations and not in terms of ethical considerations. To say that a given political concept is value independent is to say that, although it may take on evaluative meanings in everyday political discourse, it can nevertheless be defined simply for the purpose of improving our understanding of empirical phenomena and without presupposing or referring to any of these meanings. evaluative. Value independence is easily confused with valuelessness and value neutrality, but the three characteristics are analytically distinct. Affirming the value independence of an ethical or political concept means emphasizing the justifying reasons (ethical versus unethical) on.