IndexIntroductionDesertion2 year separation5 year separationIntroductionMarriage and divorce are important parts of an individual's life and, as such, the law reflects this. This is a fundamental change in legal status and protection is offered by statute and common law. These rights are recognized through a statutory protection that allows divorce only when the marriage is completely broken and cannot be repaired. The current divorce law of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 does not meet the requirements. The government believes in the importance of maintaining protection, this is reflected in its recent reform proposals. In 2018 the government published a proposal proposing to reform the current obligation on people to provide evidence of what the law defines as facts. Believing that the requirement serves no purpose and harms more than helps the parties, adding that it aggravates family conflict and potentially harms children's futures. The current law in the UK was introduced in the 20th century and has developed to this day with little change. Although there was an effort to reform the law in 1996, it was later repealed without any further attempt at reform, as a result the divorce law has remained stagnant and subjected itself to criticism. This essay will focus on the need to reform divorce law, improving its foundations. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get Original Essay Divorce law was first introduced on the basis of matrimonial crime and was reformed mainly in the Divorce Reform Act of 1968. Making the sole ground for divorce irreparable breakdown of marriage on pre-established evidence. The Reform Act subsequently consolidated the foundations of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and in 1984 the total time for commencing divorce proceedings was reduced from three years to one year of marriage, to the benefit of parties to harmful marriages. S.3(1) provides a one-year absolute ban on filing for divorce after marriage. To prove an irreparable breakdown of marriage, the applicant must prove one or more of five facts specifically adultery, behavior, abandonment, 2 years of separation with both parties consenting or 5 years of separation where the respondent does not need to give consent as evidence in court. The process is usually simple if the defendant does not contest, this helps reduce application time as there are fewer variables for the court to argue over. In the case of Owens v Owens none of the five facts were satisfied. Although the court agreed that the marriage was irretrievably broken, it failed to find that sole reason was proven and could therefore not issue a divorce decree. Similarly, in Buffrey v Buffrey the Court of Appeal was unable to validate the irreparable breakdown of the party's marriage as none of the five facts could be proven. At first glance, divorce law appears not to be based on fault, but the first two and probably the third are. Adultery was originally the only available ground for divorce. Now Article 1(2)a) requires that claims based on adultery must demonstrate that the defendant has committed adultery, as well as that the claimant finds it intolerable to continue cohabitation with the defendant. The ruling in Cleary v Cleary provides the necessary link between the two elements which the wording of the statute does not provide. Statue s.1(6), offers no definition of "adultery", but a guideline stating that adultery can only be committedby the interviewee in a heterosexual way. The common law provides a similar interpretation as a voluntary relationship between two people of the opposite sex, both of whom are married but not to each other. This narrow definition was debated by Parliament in 2013 during the debate on the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill. In 2013, K. Green stated that the wording should extend and reflect marriage in today's openness towards inclusiveness. In the case of SEP v DDP the Supreme Court of British Columbia granted a request for divorce when the appellant's husband was having a homosexual relationship during the marriage, which he confessed. By comparison, it is clear that the current law is reluctant to be more inclusive. For civil unions the crime is not foreseen. This supports Tinder's view that Parliament is "squeamish about defining gay sex", meaning that the facts for adultery can only be used by same-sex spouses if the respondents' "conduct" is with the opposite sex. This unequal legal treatment is probably, in human rights terms, a clear example of discrimination, inconsistent with Article 14 of the ECHR. Furthermore, in the supplementary provision s.2(2) there is an absolute prohibition on filing an application if the parties live together for more than 6 months after the discovery of the adultery. Remaining with the respondent for such a long period of time after discovery goes against the appellants' need to demonstrate that the adultery has affected the appellant with a great enough impact to make cohabitation intolerable. The second fact that could be relied upon is where the respondent has behaved in such a way that the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to live with them, as provided for in section 1(2)b). The test was given in common law by Dunn LJ in his judgment in Livingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard. The 'behavior' need not be unreasonable but, like adultery, the act itself is not enough, it must affect the person requesting it. The requirements, however, are different and the court must apply a different test that captures objective and subjective aspects. The reference to the facts as “unreasonable behavior” is misleading. The "behavioral fact" covers a wide range of behaviors such as husband violence or distress caused by living conditions. In Katz v Katz, behavior constituted conduct comprising an act or omission, but not a state of mind. Behavior can be a minor action or series of events, as stated in Stevens v Stevens, but in cases involving mental illness, Rees J held that the court must take into account the disabilities and temperaments of both parties, the cause of the behavior and whether the applicant is aware of these causes, the intention, the impact on the applicant and the family unit, the duration and the prospects for recovery or improvement in the future. Which unfortunately has not been explored with a precise understanding of the effects of mental illness. Desertion As a third fact, desertion is rarely used. The requirements under S.1(2)c) differ from separation in that the respondent has voluntarily and intentionally abandoned the applicant without his consent for 2 consecutive years with no intention of returning. A definition was given in Le Brocq v Le Brocq, however, a clearer one is given in Quraishi v Quraishi. Where abandonment consists in the unjustified withdrawal from the cohabitation of one of the spouses without the consent of the other and in remaining permanently separated, almost echoing the law. Although Perry v. Perry grants an exclusion whereby the defendant's abandonment will not be held if the claimant acted in a way that justified the abandonment,.