Disaster is a serious event that causes serious changes in society with human, economic, material and environmental losses. BP failed to make adequate emergency plans for an explosion at the Deepwater Horizon oil well and then misled officials about how much oil spilled when the worst happened. The May 2010 deep-sea catastrophe killed eleven men and spilled oil for miles along the Louisiana coast, causing billions of dollars in damage to the fishing and tourism industries. About 5 barrels of oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico, making it the worst disaster in world history. BP spent 86 days struggling to cap the well using various techniques known as “Cofferdam,” or “top hat.” It also includes pumping mud and other material into the blowout preventer. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay The investigative team "found no evidence that BP performed a formal risk assessment of critical operational decisions made in the days before the outbreak. BP's failure to fully assess the risks associated with a number of operational decisions that led to the blowout was a contributing cause of the Macondo blowout.” The report also states that cost- or time-saving decisions made by BP “without consideration of contingencies and mitigations” contributed to the disaster, as did failure. of the energy company to ensure that all risks associated with operations on the Deepwater Horizon were as low as reasonably practicable.” Although reading some of the contents of the report, Mr. Moss said he was aware, “there were striking similarities to the Piper Alpha accident in the North Sea. many years ago.” The Piper Alpha platform was destroyed by fire in 1988 after an explosion, killing 168 people. Earl's stated 2012 reports indicated that the well site was still leaking. After various investigations conducted it was concluded that he was responsible for the explosion and oil spill. The US government stated in a September 2011 report that, due to faulty cement in the well, BP was to blame, but platform operator Transocean and contractor Halliburton were also partially to blame. In early 2011, a White House commission had blamed BP and its partners for a series of cost-cutting decisions and an inadequate safety system, but they also concluded that the spill was the result of "systemic" root causes and " in the absence of significant reforms in both industrial practices and government policies, it could well happen again.” Numerous investigations had shown that the cause of the explosion was the chaos created by cement, drilling mud, fluid pressure, incorrect tests, management problems and poor decisions. The blowout preventer temporarily sealed the well, but then failed, which caused the massive spill. According to the investigation the accident was caused by the failure of eight different safety systems that were supposed to prevent this type of accident: The bottom of the well was not completely sealed by concrete and as a result oil and gas started leaking through it in the pipe leading to the surface of the body of water. BP found that the cement formulation was not effective. Similarly, the bottom of the tube towards the surface was plugged in two ways. It was also filled with concrete and also contained two mechanical valves designed tostop the flow of oil and gas. But all these measures failed, allowing the oil and gas to travel up the pipe to the surface. Team members conducted various pressure tests to determine whether the well was sealed or not. The results of these tests were misinterpreted, which led to the belief that the well was under control. The crew should have been able to recognize the flow of oil and gas from the unexpected pressure increase in the well, but they were unable to detect the pressure increase that occurred approximately 50 minutes before the rig exploded, considering that it wasn't a loss. About 8 minutes before the explosion, a mixture of mud and gas began to pour onto the floor of the platform. Members tried to close a valve in a device called a blowout preventer, which sits on the ocean floor above the top of the well. It didn't work properly, even though members had the ability to divert the mud-gas mixture away from the plant, through pipes on different sides. Instead, the flow was diverted to a device on board the plant designed to separate small amounts of gas from a sludge flow. The so-called mud-gas separator quickly overflowed and flammable gas began to surround the platform. A gas detection system was installed on the top of the plant. It starts as soon as the alarm sounds, activating the ventilator fans to prevent the gas from reaching the plant's motors and causing a fire, but the alarm system was deactivated to stop the false alarm from sounding. The explosion destroyed the control lines that the crew was using to close the safety valves in the blowout preventer. However, the blowout preventer has its own safety mechanism where two separate systems were supposed to automatically close the valves when it lost contact with the surface. It appears one system had a dead battery and the other had a faulty switch. As a result, the blowout preventer did not close. “It is clear that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the catastrophe. Multiple parties were involved, including BP, [oil services company] Halliburton and [offshore drilling company] Transocean," said Tony Hayward, BP's chief executive. The report even mentioned that the oil operators were to blame platform Safety Committee investigator Mary Beth Mulcahy said well owner BP and rig operator Transocean did not individually test blowout preventers for safety reasons. They simply tested the device in its own together It was discovered that there were two sets of faulty cables causing problems and a dead battery. Mulcahy also said that individual testing was suggested by the manufacturer of the preventive product, but the companies instead followed a standard set by the. industry. The safety commission also found that the drill pipe bent before the accident occurred. Not only were the pipe failure blowout prevention devices equally at fault, as stated by the investigation team in the report. To overcome the flaws, the investigation team has prepared a report stating recommendations that can prevent such incidents in the future. First of all, starting from a technical point of view. Strengthen BP's rig audit to improve closure and verification of rig audit results and actions