This chapter will look at the EU's interests and general approach towards energy trade with Russia. It will illustrate the Commission's divergent approaches to individual Member States and the negative effect this has in terms of achieving a collective political approach towards Russia. The internal and external dimensions of the Commission's energy policy will be viewed through a constructivist lens, to highlight the limitations of the constructivist approach in accurately reflecting the relevant dynamics. Furthermore, the individual approaches of some Member States will serve to highlight the heterogeneity of actors and their interests, despite the rhetoric of solidarity. In conclusion, this section will show that, while energy trade remains indispensable for both sides, the EU's approach is contrary to the interests of Russia and some member states. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay The 2006 European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy was symbolic in terms of EU energy policy. While focusing on potential external issues such as Russia, the European Commission's overall strategy prioritizes the internal creation of a unified energy market. A liberalized internal energy market should provide the Commission with greater influence over external energy suppliers. This would create better competition, as well as access to alternative suppliers through infrastructure investments. Furthermore, it would ensure a reduction in the consequences of supply disruptions, as well as greater political cooperation between Member States. The promotion of internal cooperation by the Commission is therefore aimed at increasing cohesion in terms of external policies towards actors such as Russia (Youngs 2009). The progressive liberalization of the EU internal energy market has undergone continuous changes since the end of the Cold War. As part of the European Energy Charter, several directives or “packages” have been issued on behalf of the EU. They established a common legal framework, regulating internal transportation, supply and production of energy. The Third Package of 2009 was intended to provide greater competition, unify the energy market and allow consumers to choose their suppliers (Memo: TEP, 2011). This choice means that EU member states can require suppliers to sell a share of their transport and distribution infrastructure or to provide partial management roles to independent companies within a given member state. In doing so, Member States receive greater control over the energy sector. Furthermore, pipeline suppliers are obliged to reserve the use of pipelines for third-party suppliers. Overall, these restrictions constitute a decrease in the lobbying capabilities of suppliers, while increasing the financial leverage of consuming countries (Noel, 2009, p. 22). Furthermore, future construction of additional pipelines is further limited and will need to meet the above-mentioned criteria. The third-party supplier certification process is arbitrarily determined, while channels reserved for non-existent third-party suppliers remain unused (Cottier et al., 2010). Of course, from the Russian perspective, this market reform constitutes a loss of overall ownership of the pipeline and appears to specifically target Gazprom. Russian access to the European energy market would therefore be limited and existing projects, such as agreements with individual member states, would require arenegotiation (Mandil 2008: 20; McGowan 2008: 101). However, not all of these Member States support the Commission's efforts to design a liberalized internal market for external relations. While market liberalization was expected to permeate the EU-Russia energy dialogue, member states' individualistic policies have actively ignored the notion of solidarity. Countering the Commission's objectives reveals the heterogeneity of interests and approaches within the EU. For example, Member States with a privatized energy market (e.g. Spain) are less likely to comply with overall liberalisation. On the other hand, sufficiently liberalized national energy markets (e.g. England) are incentivized to support it further. Likewise, member states that find themselves overly dependent would benefit from greater liberalization in terms of leverage in the energy market (Belyi 2009: 123; Youngs 2009: 33). Therefore, there is a difference between member states that prefer regulation by market forces, while others are more inclined to pursue opportunistic bilateral deals with Russia for the sake of economic profit. This is partially attributed to the 2008 economic crisis (Economist 201). Ultimately, the different understanding of energy security among Member States has led to conflicting internal approaches to energy market liberalisation. The EU's approach of internally liberalizing the energy market to regulate external relations is explained in existing academic contributions through social constructivism. Constructivism perceives actors as part of the environment in which they act. The environment as a shared system of meanings determines the identity and preferences of actors (Christiansen et.al. 1999; Pollack 2010: 24). Interests thus become social constructs, defined internally (Wendt, 1999). For the EU, the basis of internal regulation is the cooperative approach to energy policies together with pre-determined rules. From this point of view, the Commission sticks to the principle according to which the benefits of cooperation are perceived to outweigh the disadvantages. The EU has thus maintained peace and cooperation through the regulation of behavior Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 13. While these principles of cooperative mutual benefit are applied internally, a constructivist perspective sheds light on how they project on external energy policies Hughes 2007; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Westphal 2006). However, despite the insight provided by this perspective, it fails to account for some power dynamics (Hyde-Price 2006: 218). In this regard, the EU-Russia energy relationship not only reveals the EU's dependence, but also constitutes an essential market for Russia. Based on the above, it can be argued that the Commission possesses a certain degree of political influence over Russia. Therefore, the Commission's approach is not simply identity-driven but also exercises a realist power dynamic by attempting to dictate the rules of trade. The relationship therefore represents a power struggle, in which the EU seeks to impose regulations and diversify Russian offerings, while Russia attempts to apply bilateral agreements to overcome the EU's restrictive measures. For example, the 2007 European Charter Treaty, which was supposed to consolidate some of the aforementioned market regulations, can be seen as an attempt by the EU to strengthen control over the energy sector (Kirchner & Berk 2010: 872). Having applied it provisionally, Russia ultimately failed to ratify it due to difference in interests. The aforementioned reduction of Russian control overtransit lines constituted an EU attempt to reduce the Russian monopoly on energy transport, which would help the EU further diversify supply beyond Russia's control. For Russia, this would jeopardize its status in the European market, as it would reduce overall shares and price leverage. In 2009 Russia finally rejected the European Charter Treaty. The EU, on the other hand, insisted on maintaining the internal conditions of a liberalized market. Although energy trade remained ongoing, this symbolizes the difference in interests between the EU and Russia. The constructivist perspective offers further insight into the power dynamics at play. The EU routinely uses weak incentives to coerce other international actors through the projection of norms and values, as well as through economic and political incentives. The EU's international impact in terms of shaping norms and values ​​outwards has given rise to the idea of ​​Europe as a normative power (Manners, 2002). While the absence of a regional military favors alternative methods of influence, it is often seen as a way to avoid power dynamics by maintaining common rules of conduct. The aim is to influence the identities, norms and values ​​of other international actors, to make them converge with those of the EU. However, as this can be seen as beneficial for the EU, it becomes difficult to distinguish between a purely value-based approach and one aimed at empowerment. The EU's regulatory approach is repeatedly applied to external actors, despite the renunciation of political and economic incentives, such as EU membership. This is inherently indicative of a submissive approach towards Russia, where it is urged to converge with EU norms, values ​​and, above all, regulatory terms. From the Russian perspective, the EU's regulatory approach ignores not only Russia's interests, but also its values ​​and norms. Similar to the constructivist perspective on the EU's external energy policies, the perception of Europe as a normative power also proves inconsistent, due to its description as values-driven, rather than as a potential instrument of political leverage. In conclusion, the constructivist perspective of the EU in terms of EU-Russia energy relations ignores the inherent power dynamics of EU regulatory measures for political gain. As mentioned above, Member States actively undermine the Commission's approach towards Russian energy. This is partly due to the sensitive nature of energy security between member states, which tends to avoid collective action. Considering the energy import-dependent nature of most EU Member States, the focus on the notion of energy security has understandably been a primary focus of EU energy studies, predominantly assessing the EU's status vis-à-vis energy suppliers. energy like Russia. Within this focus, there have been references to a general lack of solidarity from the EU and its member states regarding energy relations with Russia (Energy Security Strategy, 2019). This lack of collective efforts has prevented substantial progress towards a common policy approach, in terms of the broader EU-Russia energy discourse. The relevant literature often presents individual member states as having a unique relationship with Russia, particularly Germany (Rahr, 2007). Existing constructivist academic contributions, however, lack the explanatory insight needed to explain this violation of solidarity, while at the same time pursuing individual energy relations with Russia (Noel, 2008, p. 8). Therefore, this sectionIt will apply a more detailed perspective to the EU and therefore highlight the presence of realistic trends on the part of EU member states and non-state actors when it comes to Russian energy. This trend will be explained primarily using Germany as an example and subsequently linked to the broader theoretical implications of the investigation as a whole. Similar to the long-term energy relationship between the EU and Russia, bilateral agreements with Russia also have a long history. Considering the ongoing bilateral agreements between EU member states and Russia, diversification towards alternative suppliers outside Russia is difficult. Based on the existing energy infrastructure between Member States and Russia, some Member States are more dependent on Russian transit lines than others (Green Paper, 2006). However, despite little dependence on Russian gas pipelines, countries like Germany still chose to pursue bilateral energy deals with Russia, regardless of the EU's call for solidarity. This is explained among other things by the increase in the bargaining power that the large importers of Russian energy have towards Gazprom and by the possible revenues that they guarantee to the Russian state. Therefore, the incentives for bilateral cooperation with Russia are determined by factors such as the relative size of the domestic energy market, total import volumes and the overall share of Russian energy imports (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 581). Based on these criteria, member states are inclined to act according to their general status regarding the Russian energy discourse. Those with a relatively weaker position aim to decrease Russian influence, while those with a less compromised bargaining position pursue bilateral agreements with Russia, to benefit from the high volume of Russian supplies and geographical proximity, decreasing the overall price and costs of transit. and Italian imports, constitute approximately 50% of Russian gas exports (Girardi, 2018). Based on the previously outlined criteria that provoke bilateral behavior, countries like Germany tend to have a more committed stance towards energy deals with Russia. These agreements are notably exemplified through bilateral contracts not only with the Member States concerned, but more specifically with national gas companies, such as "Ruhrgas" (Germany), "ENI" (Italy) and "Gaz de France Suez" (France ) Kirchner & Berk 2010: 868. A more recent example of this is the 2018 start of construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, marking a rift between Eastern European countries concerned about Russian influence and those cooperating with Russia, like Germany. To put this into perspective, the latest EU regulation on gas supply was issued in 2017, referring to the notion of “solidarity” more than a hundred times (Regulation, 2017). Based on the past and ongoing bilateral agreements between EU member states and Russia, this regulation is perceived simply as a rhetorical continuation, which in reality is actively opposed by individual states. In terms of cooperation between countries such as Germany and Russia, this even constitutes a deepening of existing cooperation initiatives, such as the original Nord Stream project. The original Nord Stream pipeline was intended to directly supply energy from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. It was launched in 2005 under the name Northern European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p. 585). Initially including only Germany, the project continued to involve Dutch and French stakeholders. Other EU states have urged Germany to reconsider.