IndexContextDisarmamentDemobilizationReintegrationConclusionDisarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs are widely regarded by both scholars and practitioners as key peacebuilding operations after civil war. At its most basic level, the DDR process refers to efforts often conducted internationally to disarm combatants by documenting their weapons and disposing of them, demobilize them by removing the armed group's chain of command, and reintegrate them into broader society through programs aimed at empowering them candies. economically, providing them with psychological assistance, counseling and reconciling them with their communities. The explicit aim of the DDR is to avoid future rearmaments and achieve lasting peace. As the saying goes, however, the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and failed DDR programs can lead to a resumption of hostilities and the creation of a conflict trap, especially when they fail to attract enough fighters or have a high attrition or dropout rate. non-compliance rates. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay This essay will examine the reasons for the abandonment and non-compliance of DDR programs regarding the UN-led Afghanistan New Start Program (ANBP) taking place between 2003 and 2006. It examines how these factors emerged in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration phases. It concludes that, while the broader context of the conflict in Afghanistan fostered failure, problems with ANBP planning and implementation contributed to combatants failing to carry out DDR policies. Background The ANBP took place under the joint auspices of the United Nations Aid Organization. Afghanistan Mission and United Nations Development Programme, following the 2001 Bonn Agreement on interim arrangements in Afghanistan pending the restoration of permanent government institutions. The major donor, Japan, consulted on decision-making with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada (Chrobrok, 2005, p. 23). The ANBP primarily targeted Afghan militia forces (AMF), which had fought against the Taliban, and associated militias. At the same time, under the auspices of UNICEF, a separate DDR program, targeting child fighters, took place. From the beginning, the program faced several difficulties. First, it was not meant to operate in a post-war context, but in the context of an ongoing civil war. Second, it has been plagued by infighting and a lack of coordination between donors, international organizations, militias, and the Afghan government (Chrobrok, 2005, p. 35). An important issue has been the lack of coordination between entities responsible for closely related processes such as DDR, security sector reform, governance and counter-narcotics. Resistance to the DDR process by high-level militia commanders and corruption have also led to a number of problems, as many disarmament and reintegration packages misappropriated grassroots fighters and registered "fake" fighters for get more funds. Most authors agree that the ANBP has had a very low success rate in terms of engaging combatants and ex-combatants. Little monitoring and evaluation was conducted. It is therefore difficult to estimate exactly how many fighters have abandoned the program at various stages. However, Rossi, Guistozzi and Zyck estimate, through a qualitative analysis, that a numberconsiderable number of combatants have abandoned the DDR process at various stages or have not complied with its directives. For example: decommissioning weapons, or only one of their many weapons, or acquiring new weapons after "disarmament", or not demobilizing by declaring themselves demobilized, or selling off equipment provided through reintegration grants.DisarmamentWhile the disarmament program of the ANBP was successful when it came to accounting for and disposing of heavy weapons materials (Gossman, 2009, p. 5), it was much less so when it came to small arms. Of all the weapons registered in the hands of the militias, only 56% were returned and disposed of. Of these, most consisted of old, unserviceable weapons, or cheap Pakistani imitations. Failure to comply with regulations in the disarmament phase can be somewhat attributed to the broader context of Afghanistan. The country traditionally has a “strong gun culture” (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015, p. 7), while noncombatants also have access to firearms and use them to protect their farms, livestock and the properties. Furthermore, Afghanistan's borders with Iran and Pakistan are exceptionally porous, meaning there were ample opportunities for fighters to acquire low-cost weapons for disarmament programs or to quickly replace decommissioned weapons. Ex-combatants were also demotivated to disarm as monetary rewards for weapons were never given or were misappropriated by commanders. In addition to the reasons for noncompliance, a major security dilemma existed for ex-combatants formally enlisted in the ANBP. Many rival militias were not targeted by the program and remained armed. Security sector reform lagged behind established goals, and during this period Afghanistan did not have an effective police or army, so it was up to ex-combatants to ensure their personal safety. Mistrust was also an important factor in the failure to comply with the disarmament process. as “a number of political leaders sought to strengthen their position by spreading the word that the entire agreement was designed to allow foreign forces to disarm the mujahideen and then put them on trial” (Gossman, 2009, p. 13) . Ethnic tensions also played a role. Tajik-affiliated militias suspected that the DDR program was biased in favor of the Pashtuns and, as a result, feared disarmament. While militias affiliated with Uzbekistan in northeast Afghanistan feared disarmament because they suspected the program was biased in favor of the Tajiks. Demobilization Overall, ANBP demobilization efforts failed to sever social ties between fighters and commanders. Many officially demobilized militias remained active, causing multiple security incidents. At the high command level, failure to comply with regulations is due to failure to apply demobilization incentives. For example, many parties managed to circumvent the law on political parties, which prohibited elections of parties associated with militias, with the aim of pushing them to demobilize. Furthermore, a blind eye was turned to illegal militias maintained by several politically appointed commanders. In many cases, reintegration packages strengthened the pre-DDR chain of command rather than weakened it. Literacy and vocational training courses would be hosted in the residences of former high commanders, and business activities would be supported by their patronage and illegal smuggling networks. The financial demobilization incentives offered to senior commanders were adequate, according to Dennys (2005, p. 2). describing themas even more generous than necessary, since most of them already had sufficient economic and social capital to ensure successful economic survival. Low- and mid-level commanders were not subject to the same generous policies, as they were offered the same packages offered to ordinary fighters. This led to a reduction in incentives for demobilization, as not only would these mid-level commanders face an economic disadvantage by demobilizing and disengaging from their militias, but they would also face a loss of social status and prestige. Many former combatants interviewed by Zyck (2009, p. 122) reported that the perceived loss of prestige, dignity and respect is a barrier to demobilization. At the grassroots level, problems with planned reintegration packages also hampered demobilization efforts. In some sectors, the long waiting times between the disarmament phase and the reintegration phase of the DDR program were decisive, causing many soldiers to remain close to the militia leaders or to renounce demobilization altogether. After disarmament, fighters were granted food aid for two months, while having to wait up to six months for their reintegration process, this led them to seek financial assistance through former commanders or support themselves through criminal enterprises (Dennys, 2005, p. 5).ReintegrationThe US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction clearly states that “none of the post-2001 reintegration programs have succeeded in allowing significant numbers of former combatants to reenter civilian society” (SIGAR, 2019 , p. 3). The context of Afghanistan, with its decades of ongoing conflict, weak state and economy, natural resource issues, ethnic tensions, illicit drug production, porous borders and governance problems, presents multiple pervasive issues regarding reintegration. While the best-planned and best-managed DDR program would have struggled to successfully reintegrate ex-combatants socially and economically, the ANBP was neither. The program's reintegration packages failed to consider the specificities of both ex-combatants and the communities into which they were to be integrated. in. It did not provide psychological or social reintegration aid, but focused exclusively on economic measures. When it came to implementing such economic measures, combatants were reduced to a limited number of basic characteristics (e.g. age and literacy) and seen as a homogeneous group (Zyck, 2009, p. 114), and many complained about being forced to participate in programs that were not personally suitable (Rossi and Guistozzi, 2006, p. 11). Some of the early problems with the reintegration program were long and unequal waiting times ranging from 35 days in some areas to six months in others, leading frustrated fighters to rearm or engage in illegal activities to support themselves (Rossi and Guistozzi, 2006 , p. 10). The relatively small reintegration packages were also affected by the rival opportunity to engage in poppy cultivation and opium trade, especially if we take into account the lack of coordination between DDR operations and those fighting drug trafficking. For ex-combatants, those activities presented much more lucrative opportunities. And for those who were granted little land, equipment and/or training through their rehoming packages, the hardy poppy plant proved to be a better return on investment than the wheat they would have had to grow. Since opium poppies are not only more valuable financially,.