Somali Piracy: The Path to Radical Change on the World's Most Important Waterways beginning of the 90s. The Somali pirate, the method and motivation with which they attacked merchant ships, and the initiative of a naval officer paved the way for a radical change in the way merchant ships navigated through one of the busiest and most important waterways of the world. To conclude, how this initiative has influenced my decision making as both a ship safety manager and corporate safety manager since 2008. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay "The Pirates of Our Imagination Are Romantic Figures." They engage in acts of great audacity. They search for buried treasure and force their enemies to walk the plank. If they're Johnny Depp's type of pirate, they might as well get the girl. And then they disappear, ready to plunder another day.” Well organised, well financed and motivated, the modern pirate bears no resemblance to the 'Jack Sparrow' image described above. Heavily armed with semi-automatic weapons and grenade launchers, Somali pirates attack with impunity and instill fear in every seafarer sailing through the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Figure 1 depicts the stretch of waterway between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea and is located between the coasts of Yemen to the north, Somalia to the south and the Arabian Sea to the east. It covers approximately 205,000 square miles (530,000 square km) with a total length measuring 920 miles (1,480 km) from east-northeast to west-southwest. The widest part measures about 300 miles (480 km) from north-northeast to south-southwest. At its peak in 2008, depending on the numbers you look at, Somali piracy was considered a legitimate threat to international trade and, depending on the numbers you read, it was estimated to cost shipping between $6 billion and $10 billion per year. 'year. they estimate that 12% of world trade passes through the Suez Canal and therefore; affected by this threat. Countries in the Indian Ocean region, whose ports are relatively close to pirate waters, ship about 60% of their imports traveling through pirate-infested waters. The success of a Somali pirate was and remains to this day achieved through a simple Modus Operandi. A small strike group sailed from the coast of Somalia in small fast boats into the Gulf of Aden. There they sat and waited, hunting. The prey didn't matter; oil tankers, cargo ships, yachts, passenger ships, tugboats, chemical tankers; nothing was certain. The vulnerability of the ships and the addition of human lives to the mix and once captured, this almost always guaranteed the pirates a lucrative profit. Attacks were not uncommon against commercial shipping in the period 2005-2007, however it was difficult to obtain a true number of actual incidents. In their report, they documented the justifications that some ships and companies had for not reporting a hijacking: the extent of piracy is difficult to assess; There may have been other cases that went unreported as many companies do not report incidents of piracy for fear of increased insurance premiums and causing lengthy and time-consuming investigations.” The same could be said of ransoms. Shipowners and companies did not want to divulge any information about the amount of money involved, negotiated and paid. What was clearwas that the frequency of attacks was increasing and the maritime areas of the Gulf of Aden, Bab el Mandeb and the wider Indian Ocean were becoming the most pirate-infested waters in the world. Something had to be done not only for the sake of the seafarers held captive, but also for the spiraling costs attributed to this criminal act... but what? It was in 2008, while watching a television documentary on how to police a long stretch of the M1 motorway using just two vehicles, that triggered a "eureka moment" for a British naval officer. Concerned about the increase in piracy attacks and the human cost to seafarers, his Maritime Security Patrol Area initiative was launched. This initiative consisted of coordination between military and commercial coalition forces that could provide a long-overdue short-term solution in response to pressure from the International Maritime Organization and other organizations to assist with deterring attacks against commercial vessels. The fundamental idea was that of funnel transport through a narrow corridor. Coalition forces could then focus their efforts on destabilizing criminal activities, including piracy. This would be achieved with warships patrolling the area and aircraft flying in the airspace above, thus creating a safe corridor for commercial vessels to navigate.” Because defensive measures would be much more effective if concentrated in a smaller area. In such a vast sea area, it was a mistake to believe that naval forces alone could provide a robust and timely response to protect all merchant ships at all times. The safe corridor initiative at a minimum concentrated commercial vessels in an area where a more coordinated response could be achieved and protection provided with limited resources, i.e. with fewer resources covering a defined maritime area. In such a vast maritime area, it was wrong to believe that naval forces alone could provide a strong and timely response to protect all merchant ships at all times. The safe corridor initiative at a minimum concentrated commercial vessels in an area where a more coordinated response could be achieved and protection provided with limited resources, i.e. with fewer resources covering a defined maritime area. The ships, however, benefited from the MSPA; hijackings and attacks continued at an alarming rate within the MSPA. This could be attributed in part to the fact that pirates now knew where to hunt for their prey. Figure 3 shows the MSPA with hijacks and attacks from September 15, 2008 to January 12, 2009. Due to the increase in attacks, the term “safe corridor” has been considered by some to be misleading. Garofano and Dew in their book 'Deep Currents and Rising Tides' argue that this MSPA did not ensure security, because, 'despite the significantly strengthened naval presence now in the region, there were simply not enough warships to provide full patrols. Indeed, if four warships were tasked with patrolling the MSPA, only 24% of the corridor and 4% of the overall area would be covered." In response to these attacks, the initiative evolved and military authorities made a significant change to the MSPA. On 1 February 2009 the original patrol area was moved south of its original position, the characteristic 'curve' was eliminated, and was effectively transformed into a motorway. two lanes. The MSPA became known as the International Recommended Transit Corridor. Figure 4 shows the purple zone of the original MSPA corridor and the new IRTC corridor. Each lane consisted of two 5 nautical mile wide shipping lanes, a red zone ineastbound and a westbound green zone, each lane measured 490 nautical miles long and 12 nautical miles wide; each lane would be separated by a 2 nautical mile sterile area. We know that the initial MSPA did not guarantee a secure corridor to prevent an attack and neither did the IRTC, however; when used in conjunction with best management practices and practical measures to avoid, deter or delay pirate attacks, it has provided a defense-in-depth methodology to mitigate that risk and provide better protection and response to a pirate attack. Collectively, numerical security, communication, reporting and planning were the 4 proven principles identified and applied to both the MSPA and IRTC framework. The MSPA initiative provided a defined maritime area where coalition forces and commercial shipping could effectively amalgamate and align procedures and protocols to mitigate pirate attacks. Numerical security allowed coalition forces to concentrate multiple ships in one area rather than simply spread across this vast sea area. In recent times, of course, as the MSPA has evolved, the IRTC has provided different group speeds that have given coalition assets flexible area to better cover the designated area. Communication Specific contact numbers have been cascaded from military sources, including a 24/7 emergency number, constantly manned by a 24/7 operations center. Regular contacts with naval assets in the area were maintained via VHF radio. The UKMTO became the focal point for any reports of piracy. The UKMTO would then direct the military response. Commercial vessels would advise military authorities in advance of their intentions to transit the MPSA or IRTC, then follow up on daily reports. Any speed deviation or significant course alteration would alert coalition forces through their classified real-time tracking system. Conclusion Who would have thought that the paradox of a highway and a safe corridor at sea would mitigate the risk of a pirate attack? Well, it was and is. The RN officer's initiative to take an idea from a television program and convince first the coalition forces and then the shipping companies that this would or could work was truly a great feat of ingenuity. Please note: this is just an example. Get an article customization now from our expert writers. Get a Custom Essay The MSPA initiative has enabled a more concerted and rapid response by military assets patrolling the Gulf of Aden, while providing security to commercial shipping. Along with many others, I was among the first to take a ship through the MSPA in 2009 as the ship's safety officer. Although the current IRTC says "recommended", it is a mandatory instruction for my fleet to plan their sea passage through it. In my experience, numerical security outweighs the arguments against, but what is clear is that the pirate's ability to attack with impunity and without recourse is now diminished due to one person's initiative. Bibliography Kemp, R., 2010. Piates. London: Penguin.Burlando, A. a. CAD a. LLM, 2014. The Trade Consequences of Maritime Insecurity: Evidence from Somali Piracy, Oregon: University of Oregon. United Nations Security Council, 2005. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia under Security Council Resolution 1587 (2005), New York: United Nations Security Council. Doyle, M., 2006. Somali piracy is the worst in the world..

Topic > Somali Piracy: The Path to Radical Change on the World's Most Important Waterways beginning of the 90s. The Somali pirate, the method and motivation with which they attacked merchant ships, and the initiative of a naval officer paved the way for a radical change in the way merchant ships navigated through one of the busiest and most important waterways of the world. To conclude, how this initiative has influenced my decision making as both a ship safety manager and corporate safety manager since 2008. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay "The Pirates of Our Imagination Are Romantic Figures." They engage in acts of great audacity. They search for buried treasure and force their enemies to walk the plank. If they're Johnny Depp's type of pirate, they might as well get the girl. And then they disappear, ready to plunder another day.” Well organised, well financed and motivated, the modern pirate bears no resemblance to the 'Jack Sparrow' image described above. Heavily armed with semi-automatic weapons and grenade launchers, Somali pirates attack with impunity and instill fear in every seafarer sailing through the waters of the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Figure 1 depicts the stretch of waterway between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea and is located between the coasts of Yemen to the north, Somalia to the south and the Arabian Sea to the east. It covers approximately 205,000 square miles (530,000 square km) with a total length measuring 920 miles (1,480 km) from east-northeast to west-southwest. The widest part measures about 300 miles (480 km) from north-northeast to south-southwest. At its peak in 2008, depending on the numbers you look at, Somali piracy was considered a legitimate threat to international trade and, depending on the numbers you read, it was estimated to cost shipping between $6 billion and $10 billion per year. 'year. they estimate that 12% of world trade passes through the Suez Canal and therefore; affected by this threat. Countries in the Indian Ocean region, whose ports are relatively close to pirate waters, ship about 60% of their imports traveling through pirate-infested waters. The success of a Somali pirate was and remains to this day achieved through a simple Modus Operandi. A small strike group sailed from the coast of Somalia in small fast boats into the Gulf of Aden. There they sat and waited, hunting. The prey didn't matter; oil tankers, cargo ships, yachts, passenger ships, tugboats, chemical tankers; nothing was certain. The vulnerability of the ships and the addition of human lives to the mix and once captured, this almost always guaranteed the pirates a lucrative profit. Attacks were not uncommon against commercial shipping in the period 2005-2007, however it was difficult to obtain a true number of actual incidents. In their report, they documented the justifications that some ships and companies had for not reporting a hijacking: the extent of piracy is difficult to assess; There may have been other cases that went unreported as many companies do not report incidents of piracy for fear of increased insurance premiums and causing lengthy and time-consuming investigations.” The same could be said of ransoms. Shipowners and companies did not want to divulge any information about the amount of money involved, negotiated and paid. What was clearwas that the frequency of attacks was increasing and the maritime areas of the Gulf of Aden, Bab el Mandeb and the wider Indian Ocean were becoming the most pirate-infested waters in the world. Something had to be done not only for the sake of the seafarers held captive, but also for the spiraling costs attributed to this criminal act... but what? It was in 2008, while watching a television documentary on how to police a long stretch of the M1 motorway using just two vehicles, that triggered a "eureka moment" for a British naval officer. Concerned about the increase in piracy attacks and the human cost to seafarers, his Maritime Security Patrol Area initiative was launched. This initiative consisted of coordination between military and commercial coalition forces that could provide a long-overdue short-term solution in response to pressure from the International Maritime Organization and other organizations to assist with deterring attacks against commercial vessels. The fundamental idea was that of funnel transport through a narrow corridor. Coalition forces could then focus their efforts on destabilizing criminal activities, including piracy. This would be achieved with warships patrolling the area and aircraft flying in the airspace above, thus creating a safe corridor for commercial vessels to navigate.” Because defensive measures would be much more effective if concentrated in a smaller area. In such a vast sea area, it was a mistake to believe that naval forces alone could provide a robust and timely response to protect all merchant ships at all times. The safe corridor initiative at a minimum concentrated commercial vessels in an area where a more coordinated response could be achieved and protection provided with limited resources, i.e. with fewer resources covering a defined maritime area. In such a vast maritime area, it was wrong to believe that naval forces alone could provide a strong and timely response to protect all merchant ships at all times. The safe corridor initiative at a minimum concentrated commercial vessels in an area where a more coordinated response could be achieved and protection provided with limited resources, i.e. with fewer resources covering a defined maritime area. The ships, however, benefited from the MSPA; hijackings and attacks continued at an alarming rate within the MSPA. This could be attributed in part to the fact that pirates now knew where to hunt for their prey. Figure 3 shows the MSPA with hijacks and attacks from September 15, 2008 to January 12, 2009. Due to the increase in attacks, the term “safe corridor” has been considered by some to be misleading. Garofano and Dew in their book 'Deep Currents and Rising Tides' argue that this MSPA did not ensure security, because, 'despite the significantly strengthened naval presence now in the region, there were simply not enough warships to provide full patrols. Indeed, if four warships were tasked with patrolling the MSPA, only 24% of the corridor and 4% of the overall area would be covered." In response to these attacks, the initiative evolved and military authorities made a significant change to the MSPA. On 1 February 2009 the original patrol area was moved south of its original position, the characteristic 'curve' was eliminated, and was effectively transformed into a motorway. two lanes. The MSPA became known as the International Recommended Transit Corridor. Figure 4 shows the purple zone of the original MSPA corridor and the new IRTC corridor. Each lane consisted of two 5 nautical mile wide shipping lanes, a red zone ineastbound and a westbound green zone, each lane measured 490 nautical miles long and 12 nautical miles wide; each lane would be separated by a 2 nautical mile sterile area. We know that the initial MSPA did not guarantee a secure corridor to prevent an attack and neither did the IRTC, however; when used in conjunction with best management practices and practical measures to avoid, deter or delay pirate attacks, it has provided a defense-in-depth methodology to mitigate that risk and provide better protection and response to a pirate attack. Collectively, numerical security, communication, reporting and planning were the 4 proven principles identified and applied to both the MSPA and IRTC framework. The MSPA initiative provided a defined maritime area where coalition forces and commercial shipping could effectively amalgamate and align procedures and protocols to mitigate pirate attacks. Numerical security allowed coalition forces to concentrate multiple ships in one area rather than simply spread across this vast sea area. In recent times, of course, as the MSPA has evolved, the IRTC has provided different group speeds that have given coalition assets flexible area to better cover the designated area. Communication Specific contact numbers have been cascaded from military sources, including a 24/7 emergency number, constantly manned by a 24/7 operations center. Regular contacts with naval assets in the area were maintained via VHF radio. The UKMTO became the focal point for any reports of piracy. The UKMTO would then direct the military response. Commercial vessels would advise military authorities in advance of their intentions to transit the MPSA or IRTC, then follow up on daily reports. Any speed deviation or significant course alteration would alert coalition forces through their classified real-time tracking system. Conclusion Who would have thought that the paradox of a highway and a safe corridor at sea would mitigate the risk of a pirate attack? Well, it was and is. The RN officer's initiative to take an idea from a television program and convince first the coalition forces and then the shipping companies that this would or could work was truly a great feat of ingenuity. Please note: this is just an example. Get an article customization now from our expert writers. Get a Custom Essay The MSPA initiative has enabled a more concerted and rapid response by military assets patrolling the Gulf of Aden, while providing security to commercial shipping. Along with many others, I was among the first to take a ship through the MSPA in 2009 as the ship's safety officer. Although the current IRTC says "recommended", it is a mandatory instruction for my fleet to plan their sea passage through it. In my experience, numerical security outweighs the arguments against, but what is clear is that the pirate's ability to attack with impunity and without recourse is now diminished due to one person's initiative. Bibliography Kemp, R., 2010. Piates. London: Penguin.Burlando, A. a. CAD a. LLM, 2014. The Trade Consequences of Maritime Insecurity: Evidence from Somali Piracy, Oregon: University of Oregon. United Nations Security Council, 2005. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia under Security Council Resolution 1587 (2005), New York: United Nations Security Council. Doyle, M., 2006. Somali piracy is the worst in the world..