Hobbes's Justification of Absolute Authority: From the State of Nature to the Justification of Collective Slavery Hobbes's political philosophy can be understood as a precursor to the social contract tradition. Characteristic of his approach is the attempt to justify absolute political authority by appealing to our rational nature, that is, to avoid a state of war, the appointment of such authority is considered to be in our rational best interests. This implies that we must collectively give up our natural freedom to ensure prolonged existence. This allows Hobbes to grant such authority unlimited and absolute power: as long as this authority guarantees our continued existence – which reflects our most fundamental drive – rebellion is strictly prohibited. Since the guarantee of our continued existence appears to function as the sole criterion for legitimate authority, one may question some of its implications. justification of absolute authority. Second, it will be argued that the guarantee of our continued existence as the sole criterion for legitimate authority is in fact contrary to our rational interests. That is, the possible scenario of collective slavery by means of such authority cannot be regarded as simply an unsatisfactory implication: the acceptance of slavery in the name of continued existence is absurd, and as such may not be in our rational interest. A reference to Rousseau will be used here. Finally, I will conclude with the observation that Rawls's approach in this context seems more intuitive and as such able to avoid the undesirable scenario of collective slavery. . Assuming such a scenario, it is not obvious whether one would rationally prefer bare existence to non-existence. It can be argued that the demarcation between a servile life and nonexistence itself is at least psychologically nonexistent. Furthermore, a servile life may reflect a qualitatively worse position than that of an interior life: a state of nature. In the latter scenario, one retains one's freedom, which may be valued or in one's rational interest more than the uncertainties inherent in such a life. The consensus regarding the institution of collective slavery would guarantee that the localization of one downwards, in the original position, does not exist among the agents of ignorance, since the veil of ignorance it is argued that the possibility of a servile life cannot be in the our rational interest. Inleiding Sociale en Politieke Filosofie – Bert van den Brink 6