The term 'Eudaimonia': 'Flourishing' or 'Happiness'? I have a number of very loosely worded things to say about eudaimonia in this essay. I hope that focusing on other specific aspects of NE later will help me put this all together better. I think the problems my sources discuss are the product of stilted readings; all of these sources have acknowledged this fact and have clarified the confusion accordingly. At the level at which I have studied so far, the Nicomachean Ethics seems unproblematic, albeit challenging, in the sense that Aristotle seems to find many of its connections too obvious to explain. I mention this as a partial explanation of the naive way in which I make the connections that Aristotle leaves us to make on our own. A good place to start is with Ackrill's brief characterization of eudaimonia: eudaimonia "is doing well, not the result of doing well" (Ackrill, p. 13). Although Irwin translates “eudaimonia” as “happiness,” I will instead use Cooper’s translation “flourishing.” The reason for my choice comes mainly from Book X, where Aristotle tells us that eudaimonia is a process and not a state (1176b5). It's easier to keep this in mind if you use the word "blooming," since "happiness" indicates a state, rather than a process, in English. Furthermore, there is a popular prejudice, especially among philosophers, against the idea that being happy is consistent with being virtuous. Thus, the use of the word "happiness" psychologically weighs the case against the credibility of Aristotle's doctrine, since he thinks that eudaimonia is a virtuous action (1176b5). His doctrine is at least made more worthy of consideration by such critics if they are first appeased by the more neutral term. Ackrill has several reasons to think that "happiness" is not the correct translation. eudaimonia is the ultimate end. While many things may be final ends, only eudaimonia is the most final end: "the one final good which all men seek" is happiness. (Ackrill, p. 12). This is where he sees the difference; what is true of happiness is not true of eudaimonia. You can give up happiness in favor of some other goal, but not eudaimonia. By suffering to do the right thing, one sees one's life falling short of eudaimonia. But it is comfort that is given up (Ackrill, p. 12). If this is true, then the idea of ​​equating happiness with eudaimonia makes Aristotle's discussions of the virtues meaningless..