Intention consists in belief, intention does not imply beliefIn this article we will discuss both Gilbert Harman's and J. David's theories of intentions Velleman. The central dispute between their two theories of intention is that Harman holds that intention involves belief, while Velleman holds that intention consists of belief. Velleman constructs a model of intention in which intention consists of belief to explain the apparent spontaneity of an agent's self-knowledge. Harman, on the other hand, rejects the thesis that intention consists of belief because of an example involving an insomniac. My goal in this article is to show how Velleman's theory of intention can avoid the problem posed by the insomniac case. The conclusion will then be that Velleman's theory is more plausible than Harman's, because it is able to successfully explain more about our commonsense observations about agents, namely how an agent's self-knowledge is spontaneous. In Harman's model, intention involves believing that when one intends to A one believes that one will do A. According to Harman, intentions are the result of practical reasoning and beliefs are the result of theoretical reasoning. For example, if I am going to write this article, I need to know that it is within my power to write it. Since knowing involves believing, I must therefore believe that I will write this article in order to have the intention of writing this article. Therefore, one comes to believe that one can do something, such as the ability to write an article, as a result of theoretical reasoning, while one comes to have an intention, such as writing an article, as a result of practical reasoning. Simply put, the process is as follows: Practical reasoning forms intentions dependent on the conclusions (beliefs) of theoretical reasoning. Now that we understand how intentions are formed in Harman, it is necessary to discuss what he thinks makes an intention an intention. intention. According to Harman, an “‘act’ of forming an intention is always a means to an end” (Harman, 157). Put another way, an intention is always a way of doing something else. This feature of intentions is what leads Harman to conclude that intentions are self-referential, in the sense that one must intend. That is, one always forms an intention intentionally. An important feature of intentions that Harman derives from this observation is that intentions are a means of guaranteeing that an agent will act in a particular way.